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Maw 
Lingards 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff had a massive personal injury claim against 
Holiday, a small company, which shared business premises and fire 
and liability insurance with its lessor, Airport, another small 
company, insured by Home. Home and Aiport refused to defend Holiday 
resulting in Holiday's assigning its rights against Airport and 
Home to plaintiff and consenting, with the knowledge of Home and 
Airport, to plaintiff's default judgment against it in the 
amount of $246,000, which sum plaintiff, Holiday and its owners, 
Maws and Lingards, seek now to recover from Airport and Home. 
DISPOSITIONS IN LOWER COURT 
Three judges made final and binding rulings on different 
aspects of the case. 
Judge Philip S. Fishier gave plaintiff judgment against 
Holiday in the amount of $246,033.08. This is a final judgment 
entered October 1, 1982, which has not been appealed. 
The aspect of the case concerning whether Airport had 
obligated itself to extend its insurance to Holiday was tried 
before Judge David B. Dee., Based on a jury finding that Airport 
had in fact made a contractual obligation to extend its insurance 
to Holiday, Judge Dee entered judgment to that effect and with 
the consent of Airport and Home, included in the judgment that 
Home's policy of insurance was in force covering Airport. This 
judgment entered October 6, 1982, is also final and not appealed. 
Finally, opposing motions were made before Judge Scott 
Daniels for summary judgment. Plaintiff and Holiday contended 
that based on the judgment of Judge Dee, as a matter of law, the 
Home insurance extended to plaintiff's claim, that her default 
judgment should be affirmed in amount as to Home and Airport, and 
that Airport and/or Home should pay plaintiff's claim. 
Airport and Home contended that plaintifffs default judg-
ment was collusive and should be set aside, that Airport had 
breached its obligation to extend its insurance to Holiday so 
that Airport was uninsured as to Holiday,and so should be found 
liable to Holiday but only on breach of contract, i.e., the 
$15,000 cash Holiday had actually paid plaintiff, rather than 
the amount of plaintiff's judgment, and that Home had no obli-
gation to either Airport or Holiday on claims originating against 
Holiday. 
Judge Daniels, in two rulings, refused to affirm the 
amount of plaintiff's judgment, but also refused to set it aside 
as collusive; granted Holiday judgment against Airport that it 
was liable to Holiday for plaintiff's claim but limited the 
amount of that recovery to the out-of-pocket cash actually paid 
plaintiff by Holiday on the basis of breach of indemnitee agree-
ment rather than failure to insure. 
Airport and Home have not appealed Judge Daniel's summary 
judgments and as to them it is final. 
Appellants accept Judge Daniels' ruling that Airport is 
liable to Holiday for plaintiff's claim, and his ruling that the 
judgment is not collusive, but appeal his refusal to find that 
Home's insurance extends to plaintiff's claim and his ruling limi-
ting the amount Holiday can recover from Airport. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek the following relief: 
1. That plaintiff's judgment be affirmed in amount as to 
all parties; 
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2. For a determination that plaintifffs claim is covered 
under the Home insurance policy. 
3. For a ruling that Home stands as a real although un-
named party, and is bound by these proceedings,. 
4. For plaintiff's fees as assignee of Holiday to its 
insurance, costs and such other relief as the court deems proper, 
5. Appellants Holiday, Maws and Lingards claim reimburse-
ment of attorney fees and costs for this appeal. (They may seek 
to file supplemental briefs in connection with this appeal.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts of Accident 
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of parties, the case's 
facts were and still are essentially straightforward. 
What the case involves is a confrontation between an in-
jured plaintiff and two small businesses, Holiday and Airport, 
on the one hand, and the insurer on the other. That is, what 
happens when an insurer refuses to defend and none of the parties 
are capable of paying the damages arising from a personal injury? 
The case complexities arise from this refusal of the in-
surer, Home, to defendant Holiday, and its maneuvers which left 
its named insured, Airport, itself uninsured. For this reason, 
Appellants felt it appropriate to break the Statement of Facts 
into two sections, first concerning the relationship of the 
parties and plaintiff's injury, and the second, about the litiga-
tion itself. 
At the time plaintiff's accident occurred, in the Holiday 
carwash, on February 29, 1980, she was an employee of Airport at 
2085 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Airport provided a parking lot for air travelers at lower 
rates than at the Salt Lake International Airport, and a continu-
ously running shuttle bus service took the travelers directly to 
and from their cars to the individual door of the airline they 
would be using. It even had a nice touch of taping a dime on the 
customer's parking receipt so the customer could call Airport on 
arrival at the terminal and have the shuttle bus en route while 
he was picking up his luggage. 
At the Airport premises, it leased a number of separate 
buildings to various small businesses. Each of these were re-
quired under their leases with Airport to maintain complete in-
surance which also indemnified Airport against any claims against 
the lessees that might also involve Airport. 
Within the building that Airport occupied was a carwash. 
Airport used this frequently, but not continuously. 
The possibility for a symbiotic relationship arose when 
Airport and Holiday discussed sharing a joint co-tenancy. Holi-
day was an existing car rental business near the airport and 
most of its rentals were with air travelers. 
Holiday, to operate its business, needed only a customer 
counter and a carwash to keep its cars clean. The customer ser-
vice counter in the Airport building was large enough to accomo-
date the clerks of both businesses, so it was arranged that 
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Holiday would rent space from Airport, that space being the car-
wash and part of the counter and parking for its cars. 
The advantage to both businesses is obvious. For air 
travelers arriving from out-of-state, they could use the Airport 
shuttle and then rent a car from Holiday. This would increase 
the number of customers for both. 
Airport discussed the matter with Gene Denning, an agent 
with Fred Moreton & Company, who had Airport covered on a compre-
hensive policy of insurance written by Home (R394-424). This 
insurance covered fire, liability, personal property, vehicle 
operation and all phases of Airport's business. It made sense 
to have both companies share a single insurance policy, if this 
could be done. While items such as personal property should be 
separately covered under separate policies, and each was entirely 
independent in operation of its own vehicles, still certain areas 
were matters of common concern. These were fires and liability 
claims arising on the premises, where either or both might be 
responsible. 
Mr. Denning spoke only to Airport, but in speaking to 
Airport, he advised that due to the co-mingling of space, a sepa-
rate policy of insurance for Holiday was not necessary because 
Holiday could be added to Airport's existing policy for fire and 
liability coverage simply by having Airport and Holiday provide 
for that in their lease (R280 L8-R282 L15)• 
Mr. Denning testified: 
"A, My discussions at that time were that if there 
was a hold harmless agreement or indemnification 
clause in the lease agreement/ that then the 
insurance policy ... . ,f [Emphasis added.] 
(R382 L13-15) 
At this point, he was abruptly cut off in his answer and 
cautioned not to make any reference to an actual policy being in 
force. The questioning continues as follows starting on the next 
line, L16, R382: 
"Q. Excuse me. Excuse me. Let me touch out front 
there. 
A. OK. 
Q. OK. Its just without reference to any policy or 
anything, sir." 
The reason Mr. Denning was cut off was that the attorney 
hired by Home to represent Airport at the trial before Judge Dee 
on the issue of whether Airport had a contractual obligation to 
extend its insurance to Holiday had brought an in limine motion 
before Judge Dee at the outset of the trial. 
During the hearing of that motion, Home's attorney, Mr. 
Stevens, told Judge Dee that he was advised by Mr. Denning that 
Mr. Denning would testify that the Home Insurance policy was in 
force covering Airport and covering Holiday. Mr. Stevens objec-
ted to that testimony on the ground of being on the ultimate issue, 
if the jury heard it, they would certainly find a contractual 
obligation existed to provide that very insurance (R371 LI 5-
R372 L6; R374 L21-25). 
Dale Lambert, representing Holiday, argued that the 
matter of insurance was inextricably bound up with the evidence 
in the case and had to go before the jury (R375 L2-11). 
Judge Dee ruled that Mr, Denning could be questioned con-
cerning the conversations about insurance,but could not state the 
insurance was in force (R376 L9-16). Hence, the interruption of 
his testimony as so vividly shown in the transcript. 
Based on this advice of Mr. Denning, Holiday and Airport 
put in their lease a clause that they would share the cost of fire 
and liability insurance, an add-on to the lease providing: 
"Lessee agrees to pay 50% of all utility bills, main-
tenance, property taxes and insurance (liability & 
fire) that pertains specifically to that one building.11 
(R392) 
In reliance on this, Holiday let lapse its existing liabil-
ity insurance (R366 %2) when it moved in with Airport. 
Mr. Denning advised the parties that they did not have to 
have Holiday named as an insured nor fill out papers because its 
inclusion as an insured was automatic as far as the policy was 
concerned on the fulfilling of two conditions. These were (1) 
that they be co-tenants of a single building, and (2) that their 
lease provide that they share the insurance. He based this advice 
on the Home policy. 
The insurance policy covers liability insurance at §11.E. 
(R402) stating; 
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"Coverage E: Liability: This company will pay on 
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of bodily injury or property damage to 
which this insurance applies, due to an occurrence, 
and this Company shall have the right and duty to 
defend any suit against the insured seeking dam-
ages on account of such bodily injury or property 
damage... . " (R402 fl) [Emphasis added.] 
The word "damages" as used in the policy would have its 
customary meaning. The first definition for damages given in 
Black's Law Dictionary is, 
"A pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may 
be recovered in the courts by any person who has 
suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to 
his person, property, or rights, through the un-
lawful act or omission or negligence of another." 
Mr. Denningfs advice that Airport not be a named insured 
in the policy was proper because in the policy's definition sec-
tion, it provided the following clause - an alternative method: 
"Insured Contract. Insured Contract means any written 
(a) lease of premises; (b) easement agreement ... ." 
[Emphasis added.] (R402 5IV, Definitions.) 
When an insured has entered into an "Insured Contract 
through a "lease," the named insured is then "legally obligated" 
to pay "damages" based on the "insured contract" for claims 
against the co-tenant and the insurer will "pay" those claims. 
The policy verifies this in its Exclusions section where 
it states: 
"This policy does not apply: (e) under coverage (E), 
to liability assumed by the insured under any con-
tract or agreement except an insured contract ... ." 
(R403, Exclusions, (e)) 
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After the parties had commenced their co-tenancy, 
Mr. Denning visited the premises, observed Holiday in its shared 
operation and approved the arrangement (R385 LI 4-19)• 
Mr. Denning also testified specifically that no insur-
ance application for Holiday was required for the coverage to 
be in force (R389 L20-R390 L19), and that no certificate of in-
surance naming Holiday was required (R383 L18-R384 L3), the 
"insured contract" taking the place of these customary documents. 
When plaintiff's claim against Holiday was first pre-
sented, Holiday immediately referred it to Airport and Home. 
Home refused to defend. Its original basis was not that there 
wasn't any agreement to share the insurance, but rather that 
Holiday had breached the agreement by not paying its 50% share 
of the cost of the insurance. Airport's defense was stated thus: 
"THIRD DEFENSE 
"Any agreement between third-party plaintiff and 
third party defendants pursuant to which insurance 
would be procured required third-party plaintiff 
to pay premiums for said insurance. Third-party 
plaintiff failed to pay any such premiums and, 
therefore, is not entitled to any insurance cover-
age." (R119) 
This answer admits by implication the agreement to insure 
or it wouldn't have a claim that an agreement existed to be 
breached by Holiday. 
At trial before Judge Dee to determine whether Airport 
had contracted to extend its insurance to Holiday, this conten-
tion of Airport's Answer was rebutted by Mr. Hinckley's own testi-
mony that Holiday hadn't paid Airport in cash because it serviced 
and washed the Airport shuttle buses as a quid pro quo work 
trade off (R551 L16-R554 L25). This led to the verdict: 
"We, the jury, find from a preponderance of the 
evidence in this case the following answer to the 
question propounded to us: 
1. That Airport Shuttle contracted or agreed to 
provide liability insurance protecting Holiday Rent-
A-Car by promising to arrange to have Holiday covered 
under Airport Shuttlefs liability policy? 
ANSWER: Yes_X 
No. " (R248) 
With the facts confirming insurance coverage existing 
between Airport and Holiday outlined above, we turn now to the 
facts of plaintiff's injuries. 
Plaintiff was a shuttle bus driver for Airport. She 
returned from a shuttle bus run, passed the counter shared by 
the employees of both companies, and stepped through the door 
leading into the car wash and service area to get a drink at the 
water fountain in the wash room. 
The car wash drain was plugged so Holiday employees had 
removed a man-hole cover to clean the drain. This man-hole was 
set a foot from the door leading from the counter area. The man-
hole cover was painted the same color as the floor. Holiday's 
employees did not tell plaintiff of this work, nor put a warning 
sign on the door, nor even leave the door open so that the man-
hole could be seen. As a result, when the plaintiff went through 
the door, she stepped directly into the open man-hole with her 
right leg. 
The man-hole opening had a sharp metal rim. Plaintiff 
fell half the length of her body. Her left leg had not gone 
into the hole so her left buttock hit the floor and simultaneously 
her back smashed against the metal rim. This fall caused a com-
bination side-ways wrenching of her body and injury to her back. 
Her injuries were so severe that on first examination, 
her doctor advised her she could not return to work for a mini-
mum of a number of months. 
Shortly after this accident occurred, and while plaintiff 
was receiving Workmen's Compensation but had filed no suit, the 
owners of Holiday, the Lingards, sold the business to the Maws. 
Both were aware of plaintiff's injury and provided in their con-
tract of sale that should plaintiff bring an action, the Lingards 
would indemnify the Maws. 
To enforce this indemnity agreement is why the Maws and 
Lingards are in this suit, an action that would not have been 
necessary had Home defended Holiday. 
In the time since the accident, the initial injuries have 
somewhat healed and are not by themselves disabling. The prob-
lem arose during plaintiff's convalesence. There is a condition 
commonly called fibrositis. This is somewhat the muscular 
equivalent of arthritis in the joints. Like arthritis, it can 
range from a mild irritation to disabling and exquisitely pain-
ful extremes. 
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As arthritis frequently arises from trauma to a joint, 
fibrositis frequently arises when muscles in the back respond 
by bloating with fluid in order to protect themselves from move-
ment when subject to severe continuous pain. The process is 
somewhat similar to the swelling which arises when an ankle is 
sprained and which serves as naturefs splint tending to immo-
bilize the ankle and to warn the victim not to use it by giving 
intense pain signals. 
The affidavit of Dr. Robert Baer, president of the Utah 
branch of the AMA in physiatry(rehabilitation medical practice) 
was submitted (R181-R186) to Judge Fishier at the time of plain-
tiff's default judgment. It is suggested that the affidavit be 
read in its entirety. While a sprained ankle involves only an 
ankle, Dr. Baer, in his affidavit, swore/ in September, 1982: 
"Present condition includes some residual component 
of the lumbar and cervical strains but it is aggra-
vated to an extreme degree by fibrositis through 
her paravertebral muscles running the length of her 
spine on either side and into the muscles of her 
hips. Her present condition is disabling and she 
has been disabled from the ability to work since 
the original accident on February 29, 198 0, except 
she would have been capable during the last year of 
extremely limited part-time employment of about 
three hours per day provided that the employment 
involved no active physical duties and no station-
ary positions ... ." [Emphasis added.] 
(R182 L6-15) 
Dr. Baer continues: 
"Fibrositis is an incurable condition and not treat-
able through surgery. Fibrositis is an inflammatory 
hyperplasia of white fiborous tissue of the body, 
especially of the muscle sheaths and fascial layers 
of the locomotor system. It is marked by edema of 
the involved muscles which causes the muscles to 
be distended even when the patient is irelaxed caus-
ing substantially reduced blood circulcition to the 
involved areas and extreme physical pain. In a 
severe and advanced condition of fibrositis, such 
as Pat has, the pain is disabling." [Emphasis 
added,] (R182 L21-29) 
At the time of the entry of the default judgment before 
Judge Fishier, Judge Fishier had before him not only Dr* Baer's 
affidavit but plaintifffs affidavit (R187-R189). These affi-
davits set forth plaintiff's economic and personal losses. 
Plaintiff's losses are summarized in the affidavit of 
James E. Hawkes, her associate counsel (R362-364) as being special 
damages of wage loss and medical expense to October 1, 1982, of 
$27,160.65, interest on the special damages of $7,287.93 from 
date of accident, a minimum future wage loss of $50,146.00 and 
minimum future medical expense of $61,438.50. These total 
$146,033.08. To this was added her request for $100,000.00 
for damages not covered by specific figures. Judge Fishier, 
being advised, gave her judgment as requested for $246,033.08. 
Home's attorney was present at the hearing. 
Had plaintiff submitted her case to a jury, she would 
have asked for a higher amount. 
The judgment is large because it should be. Plaintiff is 
divorced, raising four children, and her employment is a matter 
of necessity, not choice. She lives with disabling pain. 
Facts Concerning Litigation 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that Home 
has repeatedly taken a position adverse not only to Holiday, but 
also to its named insured Messrs, Hinckley and Howell, dba Airport 
Shuttle Parking, 
At the outset of this case, Home's attorney took the sworn 
statements of Mr. Hinckley and Mr. Howell. Plaintiff was not ad-
vised of this nor was Gerald Nielsen, representing the Maws. Dale 
Lambert representing Holiday was advised at the last moment and 
attended that session. 
Not being subject to cross-examination, the sworn state-
ments were not admissible in evidence. They would, though, serve 
to impeach Home's insureds should they later attempt to assert 
that they did have a contract to share their insurance with Holiday. 
Counsel cannot recall an occasion when he has taken sworn 
statements of his own clients. Depositions on occasion if the 
client may not be present at trial, but sworn statements, never. 
People do not know if they have a binding contract. They 
submit their facts to their attorney and he applies the legal 
criteria such as meeting of the minds, clarity of terms, considera-
tion and so forth, and tells them whether they have a contract or not. 
If there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the attorney works with the 
client to develop the facts in the light most favorable to the posi-
tion the client wants. 
For example, when there is uncertainty, if the person has 
a contract to sell a home and wants the sale to go through, with 
the assistance of his attorney, he will develop the facts showing 
the contract should be performed. If he doesn't want the sale 
to go through, he will develop the facts indicating the contract 
is not complete. 
Airport was not actually brought into the lawsuit until 
1982, the parties before then trying to get Home to extend cover-
age. By the time Airport was brought in, represented by Home, 
it knew that plaintiff had a large case. 
There are those personal injury attorneys who say they 
have observed a pattern of insurers in large personal injury claims 
to more and more frequently take the first line of defense, that 
there is no coverage extending to the claim. At any rate, it was 
clearly in Home's interest to have no contract exist obligating 
Airport to Holiday, because then Airport would not have to look 
to Home for indemnity, this putting Home in a home-free position. 
For example, the statements as sworn to didn't cover the fact that 
cash didn't have to be paid to Airport by Holiday for its share of 
the insurance premiums because Holiday had worked those off. 
The jury verdict finding Home did have a contractual obli-
gation to extend the insurance to Holiday should be sufficient to 
establish that these sworn statements were canted to favor Home. 
The question arises as to whose interest was served, that 
of the owners of Airport, or that of Home, by their statements 
being taken in sworn fashion, not by a Home insurance adjuster 
but by an attorney retained and paid by Home but serving in court 
and on paper Airport as his client. 
The next step taken by Home to favor itself at the expense 
of Airport is even more striking. It must be taken in context. 
There was an open question as to whether the Home insurance was 
in force covering Airport. This was closed by the judgment of 
Judge Dee based on the jury verdict entered with the consent and 
appearance of the attorney for Home and Airport. Judge Dee found: 
"1. Based on the jury's findings set forth above and 
the stipulation of counsel to the third party case, 
the court finds that the third party defendant, Air-
port Shuttle Parking, had a contract which obligated 
it to have the third party plaintiff, Holiday Rent-A-
Car, covered under the Airport Shuttle Parkingfs busi-
ness owner's insurance policy with the Home Insurance 
Company, which was in effect on February 29, 1980." 
(R295) [Emphasis added.] 
Robert L. Stevens, as attorney for Airport and Home, signed 
the judgment, "Approved as to Form." To complete the context, all 
the steps necessary to actually have Home cover Holiday had been 
taken. These were: 
1. Home had consented to a judgment ruling that its insur-
ance covered Airport on February 29, 19 80. 
2. The jury verdict had found that Airport had a contrac-
tual obligation to extend that very insurance to Holiday. 
3. The lease constituted an "insured contract" by which, 
under the policy terms, and within the policy terms, Airport was 
liable to pay any damages arising from a liability claim against 
Holiday. 
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4. The lease inclusion of the policy had been done uni-
laterally by Airport and Holiday, but they had acted on the advice 
of the agent for Home, Mr, Denning, and after having done so, Mr. 
Denning had come to the premises and had approved it. (R386 L14-19) 
Notwithstanding, Home took this remarkable step - it filed 
a motion for summary judgment, which Judge Daniels heard, alleging 
that although Airport had the contractual obligation to extend its 
insurance to Holiday, it had breached this obligation. 
This position should be considered. 
If Airport took the position that it had breached its agree-
ment to extend the insurance, then no insurance from Home applied 
to protect either Holiday or Airport. That would mean that Air-
port would have to pay Holiday, without assistance from Home. 
After all, what the policy provided was not direct named 
coverage of Holiday, that being unnecessary, but rather payment 
of all claims against Airport resulting from its being "legally 
obligated" to "pay" all "damages" because of an "insured contract." 
For Airport to claim that it had breached the contract 
after it was complete and the insurance coverage in force, which 
was clearly the factual situation when Mr. Denning visited, Air-
port had to have then done something which resulted in the insur-
ance no longer being in force to cover its comiriitment to Holiday. 
Shouldn't Airport1s attorney have just referred defense to Holiday 
to Home? 
It is inconceivable that an attorney would leave his client 
uninsured in the factual context that we have here. The effect 
the expense of the client, Airport. 
The question arises as to who the client was? 
To confirm this, read the language Home's attorney used 
in his "Memorandum of Airport Shuttle in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
"Under the facts of this case as was determined in 
the prior bifurcated trial, being flegally obligated' 
to pay 'damages1 because of an 'insurance contract.1 
Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with Holiday 
under which it was obligated to procure liability 
insurance. Airport Shuttle breached this obligation 
and procured no such insurance." [Emphasis added.] 
(R304) 
"In the instant case, it is undisputed that Holiday 
Rent-A-Car suffered damage of $15,000 by virtue of 
the lack of liability insurance covering it." 
[Emphasis added.] (R306) 
"As such, Holiday Rent-A-Car's damage from the lack 
of insurance is in that amount and any assignment 
or other machination of Holiday in conjunction with 
the plaintiff cannot increase that damage. [Emphasis 
added.] (R315) 
In what way did Airport breach its obligation to extend 
the insurance to Holiday? 
It must be remembered that Airport's assertions of breach 
were taken in the context of its Motion for Summary Judgment. Sum-
mary motion judgments have to be supported by facts, not by alle-
gations * What were these facts? 
In speculation, one can consider facts that might have made 
the insurance inapplicable notwithstanding Airport having committed 
itself to Holiday. For example, the agent might have been acting 
beyond the scope of his authority. Another possiblity would be 
that the premiums had not been paid for the included Holiday 
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coverage to Home. Another possibility would be that the agent, 
Mr. Denning, had overstepped his authority. 
All of these are specific facts. 
In Airport's Memorandum, no fact of any kind was stated 
to establish the acts taken by anybody to "breach" Airport's obli-
gation. (R303-329; R446-460) 
That Airport should be plead in court into a position of 
being non-insured is even more remarkable in light of the previously 
mentioned statements made by the attorney for Airport and Home 
before Judge Dee, those statements being made in order to obtain 
a favorable ruling for Airport and Home concerning testimony on 
insurance. These statements are set out verbatim as made by the 
attorney during that chambers in limine hearing. 
"Mr. Stevens: Robert Stevens representing Airport Shuttle 
Parking. This is our Motion In Limine. The motion is 
to restrict Mr, Lambert on behalf of plaintiffs - or 
third party plaintiffs, from offering the testimony of 
Mr, Gene Denning, It is our information that Mr. Denning 
will testify that he had discussions with the people at 
Airport Shuttle, that he told the people at Airport Shuttle 
that their insurance policy that at that time they had and 
continue to have today would cover them for any liability 
they might have if they were to indemnify any of their 
tenants by writing on some sort of indemnification or 
hold harmless agreement on the lease. 
"Our position is that kind of testimony puts before the 
Jury an absolute clarity the fact that Mr. Hinckley and 
Mr. Howell do have insurance that will or may cover them 
if they lose this lawsuit. Our position is that that 
kind of testimony is bound to be prejudicial and to 
allow it in would be error." (R371 L13-R372 L6) 
"(Mr, Stevens) But what I do object to is Mr. Denning 
testifying that my clients have insurance that will 
cover this agreement." (R374 L21-25)[Emphasis added.] 
Notwithstanding the lack of any facts to support this naked 
reversal that Airport had in some way breached its contract, 
Judge Daniels was still persuaded that it had. In his decision 
on the opposing motions for summary judgment, he states: 
"Since Airport seems willing to concede that it did 
breach its agreement to insure Holiday, the question 
remains as to the extent of liability for this breach.11 
[Emphasis added.] (R487) 
Having found that Airport's breach of the contract to Holi-
day did in fact exist, Judge Daniels then turned, as he indicated, 
to the measure of damages. In doing so, he applied the traditional 
measure of damages for an indemnitor who has breached a contract 
to an indemnitor to indemnify, which is reimbursement of out-of-
pocket expenses of the indemnitee. He found these to be $15,000 
(R485-488), the amount of cash paid plaintiff by Holiday. In so 
doing, he was persuaded not to use the measure of damages appro-
priate for a failure to insure or defend, although he indicated 
in that decision that such would be the full amount of plaintiff's 
claim if only Airport had insurance coverage (R487). 
These measures of damages are set out with citations in 
plaintiff's Argument,Point II. 
Thus, at the slight awkwardness of abandoning its client, 
Airport, Home succeeded brilliantly in evading the full claim it 
had otherwise to pay. 
It is so inconceivable that an attorney would concede a 
point adverse to his client, when actually the facts entirely 
support his client on that point, that a judge simply cannot con-
ceive that the concession is not of necessity. This undoubtedly 
is what led Judge Daniels to accept the concession of Airport that 
it in some unnamed way had breached its contract, despite the argu-
ment of counsel for plaintiff that Airport had not breached its 
contractual obligation, but had fully honored it. 
This is a bizarre twist in this lawsuit,. Usually when one 
finds an attorney arguing his client has not fulfilled a contract 
caluse, it is because he can justify that conduct and wants the 
client to be relieved from the consequences of the contract. Here, 
though, the reverse is true, that the consequence was to leave 
the lient not only defenseless as to Holiday, but uninsured as 
to Home, Here, the concession was made not to protect the client, 
but to protect a person not before the court because not a named 
party, Home. 
Plaintiff's counsel has never seen this situation arise 
before. No wonder Judge Daniels was misled. 
There is yet another instance of Home acting in its own 
interest through its attorney, rather than in the interest of Air-
port. Again, the context must be set forth. 
Before trial of the insurance issue alone before Judge Deef 
trial of the whole case was set for October 5, 1982. As the trial 
date approached, Holiday and its owners, the Maws and Lingards, 
very naturally became frantic. As the rock, they were facing 
plaintiff's very strong liability case. As the hard place, Home 
refused to defend or settle. 
This forced Holiday and plaintiff to enter into settlement 
negotiations. Utah had a clear precedent on how a settlement 
should be structured to preserve a claim against an insurer, 
Ammerman v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 22 U2d 187, 450 P2d 460, 
which they carefully followed. 
The agreement was that Holiday would assign all of its 
rights in the Home Insurance policy and its claims against Airport 
to plaintiff, would consent to a default in such figure as the 
court approved, would pay plaintiff all the cash it could come 
up with, which turned out to be $15,000, would provide counsel at 
its own expense in Holiday's name to assist plaintiff in recover-
ing the policy proceeds, and in consideration plaintiff agreed not 
to execute on Holiday's assets other than its rights against Air-
port and Home, 
The agreement consisted of two documents, an assignment 
(R178-180) and a settlement agreement (R190-193). 
The settlement agreement specifically provided plaintiff's 
claim far exceeded the $15,000 paid by Holiday, and that it was 
only a partial settlement. 
The affidavit of Gerald Nielsen (R365-368), attorney for 
the Maws, said the only reason that the settlement was made and 
Holiday allowed the default judgment to be entered, was that 
plaintiff's claim was in an amount that neither Holiday, the 
Maws, nor the Lingards could pay, so they had no choice but to 
settle due to Home's refusal to defend. He also states in his 
affidavit that the settlement and assignment were submitted to 
Home before being executed. It is not denied that Mr. Stevens, 
Home's attorney, was present when the default was submitted to 
Judge Fishier and he entered the $246,000-00 judgment. 
On Home's motion, Judge Croft entered an order bifurcating 
the case on September 30, 1982, five days before the trial of all 
issues. The next day, the parties went before Judge Fishier and 
he entered the consent judgment. 
Judge Croft's Order was a severe blow to plaintiff. She 
had her witnesses under subpoena, her trial brief prepared. She 
had waited two and a half years from the time of her accident for 
her trial. 
Airport had been invited to attend the settlement negotia-
tions and to join in the settlement by assigning its rights to the 
policy against Home, in exchange for which plaintiff and Holiday 
would agree not to execute on any of Airport's other assets. 
It was entirely in Airport's interest to accept this pro-
posal. Had it had independent counsel, it would undoubtedly have 
done so. By doing that, it would have had no exposure for liabi-
lity to Holiday or plaintiff, whether for $15,000 or the entire 
amount of plaintiff's judgment, and would have let Home alone 
litigate the issues of coverage and damages, as was done by the 
insured in Ammerman. 
Counsel for plaintiff has repeatedly asked Home, through 
its counsel, to acknowledge its conflict of interest and to have 
Airport get independent counsel. Home has as often refused to do 
so. This only protected Home. It was adverse to Airport* 
The time when Airport, as alleged by its counsel, breached 
" "* • .•--!-- _.J ^ A t~r* /^-VTT^ v.arTO ^^ vtnl i^v. had to be before 
the date of plaintifffs accident, February 29, 1980. 
If the breach were real, Home would have no obligation to 
pay Airport or Holiday anything. Notwithstanding this, Judge 
Dee^  in the second paragraph of his judgment (R225), awarded attor-
ney fees of $3,500 to Holiday. These were paid forthwith, not 
by Airport but by Home. 
If Home genuinely believes that Airport breached its obli-
gation to extend the insurance, Home has no involvement in the case. 
It would have paid nothing because it would have no obligation to 
Holiday to do so. That Airport had an obligation to Holiday which 
it breached does not concern Home, and the insurer does not volun-
teer money without a liability to do so. 
The only conclusion is that Airport's position that it 
breached its obligation to Holiday is a sham position. In reality, 
Home knows that the insurance covers Airport and extends to plain-
tiff's claim against Holiday, 
Home has obviously made this private, internal decision, 
or it would have told Airport of it, Home had no obligation to pay 
third party defense fees. 
What Home does now is to raise a defense - it isn't liable 
for Airport - in order to limit plaintiff's recovery, knowing the 
defense is not bona fide. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
RULING THAT THE HOME INSURANCE 
COVERS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM, 
For brevity, reference will be made back to the Statement 
of Facts when appropriate. 
Judge Daniels1 rulings stand this way. In his first judg-
ment he found that Airport had breached its obligation to extend 
its insurance to plaintiff (R485-488). 
On plaintiff's motion for re-hearing of that decision, 
Judge Daniels, in his second decision, modified his position by 
adding an "if." He stated: 
"2. If defendant Airport Shuttle Parking breached 
its obligation to provide insurance, it is liable 
to the extent of $15,000." (R501 12) 
Judge Daniels then gave plaintiff, as assignee of Holiday, 
judgment directly, but solely, against Airport in the amount of 
$15,000 (R501 24). 
Plaintiff's judgment against Airport has not been appealed 
by Airport. The question of what amount that judgment should be, 
as preserved by appellants, is covered in Point II. 
During the Motions for summary judgment, what was the status 
of the facts before the trial court concerning the matter of whether 
the Home policy covered plaintifffs claim? 
On Airport's side it had conceded that it had breached 
its obligation to extend the insurance to Holiday, but had no 
facts of any kind to support that {Airport's Memorandums on this 
point can be examined at R299-320 and 446-461). In addition, 
Airport's attorney filed his personal affidavit to dispute plain-
tiff's damages but even though plaintiffs motions had raised the 
issue of Airport submitting no facts to prove the "breach," the 
attorney's affidavit was silent In rebuttal (R481-486). 
Supporting her Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff 
did have facts included in her Motion. Her Memorandum supporting 
her motion is in the Record at pages 331-361. It includes attach-
ments of the affidavits of plaintiff (R353-355), Dr. Baer (R356-
361), Mr. Hawkes (362-364), Mr. Nielsen, attorney for the Maws 
(R365-368), the lease (R392), the insurance policy (R394-424), 
the transcript of Home's counsel's in limine motion (R369-376), 
Mr. Denning's testimony (R376-391), the jury verdict before Judge 
Dee and Judge Dee's judgment (R426-427). 
Plaintiff's facts fall into clusters, each capable of 
justifying the relief she sought. 
FIRST, JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL. During the in limine motion, 
Airport's attorney sought to obtain a favorable ruling from the 
court barring the testimony of the insurance agent, Mr. Denning, 
"that my client's have insurance that will cover this agreement." 
(Statement of Facts, p. 20). 
Judicial estoppel is not based on fraud nor deceit, but 
on a party taking inconsistent positions. The general rule is 
stated in 28 AmJur 2d Estoppel and Waiver, §69, p. 696: 
"The rule that a party will not be allowed to main-
tain inconsistent positions is applied in respect 
to positions in judicial actions and proceedings. 
as thus applied, it may be regarded not strictly 
as a question of estoppel, but as a matter in the 
nature of a positive rule of procedure based on 
manifest justice and to a greater or lesser degree, 
on considerations of orderliness, regularity, and 
expedition in litigation. Certainly the elements 
of reliance and injury, while often considered, 
do not enter into such so-called 'estoppel1 to 
the same extent that they do in equitable estoppel 
proper. The principle requiring consistency in 
judicial proceedings is, however, customarily con-
sidered a form of equitable estoppel .... . The 
rule against inconsistent positions applies gener-
ally to positions assumed not only in the course 
of the same action or proceeding, but also in pro-
ceedings supplemental thereto, including proceed-
ings for review or re-trial and even in separate 
actions or proceedings involving the same parties 
and questions." 
Utah has a case somewhat in point, Tracy Loan & Trust 
Company v. Openshaw Inv. Co., et al., 102 U 509, 132 P2d 388, 
where a man claimed in a divorce he didn't own stock, so as to 
reduce alimony, and in another case that he did own the stock in 
order to clear title to it in himself. 
The court said concerning judicial estoppel: 
"Most of the decided cases hold that the rule may 
be invoked only whssre the prior and subsequent liti-
gation involves the same parties, and where one party 
has relied on the former testimony and changed his 
position by reason of it. In other words, a person 
may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny 
any position taken in the prior judicial proceedings 
between the same persons or their privies involving 
the same subject-matter, if such prior position was 
sucessfully maintained." (102 Utah at p. 515) 
The Record shows that Home's position was successfully 
maintained. It barred the evidence of the agent, Mr. Denning, 
in the trial before Judge Dee that the insurance was in fact in 
force covering Airport and Holiday both. Judge Dee ruled for 
-9Q-
Airport holding such questions inadmissible (R376, L9-16, SF 
p. 7-8, 20). Home should be held to the in limine statements -
the Home insurance in fact covers Airport and covers Holiday. 
State of Utah, in the Interest of Davis, 28 U2d 428, 503 P2d 1206; 
Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A2d 656 (ME 1979); 
Holcher v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 409 NE2d 412 (111. 1956). 
Similarly, the insurer could be estopped from denying 
coverage where the agent has acted properly in advising the in-
sureds that coverage existed. United Pacific Ins. Co. v. North-
western Ins. Co., 185 F2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950 Ut.) 
SECOND, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment had squarely put 
the issue before Judge Daniels: 
"3, For a determination that both parties, Holiday 
Rent-A-Car and defendants Hinckley and Howell d/b/a 
Airport Shuttle Parking are covered by insurance 
policy B0P8 63 53 46, together with an umbrella 
policy in addition, issued by the Home Insurance 
Company as insurer, such being responsible for 
covering the plaintiff's liability claim in this 
case, and both are liable for plaintiff's full 
judgment." (R440) 
Plaintiff supported her Motion with affidavits, the lease, 
the insurance policy and transcripts, as previously stated at 
page 27. 
Rule 56(e), URCP requires responsive pleadings in Summary 
Judgment proceedings to be facts admissible in evidence, not just 
allegations and denials. 
To plaintiff's facts, Airport and Home submitted no tran-
script, no documents. There was no use of the insurance policy 
to show that Mr. Denning had misinterpreted, there was no showing 
of any kind that premiums had not been paid, no showing to change 
the facts conceded by Home!s attorney that its own agent would 
state the policy was in force covering Holiday at the time of 
plaintiff's accident which thereby bound Home. United Pacific 
Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., supra. 
Plaintiff had submitted facts to establish a prima facie 
case. Since none were rebutted, plaintiff was entitled to sum-
mary judgment. Massey v. Utah Power & Light, (1980) 609 P2d 937. 
(Contentions unsupported by specifications of fact do not preclude 
entry of summary judgment. The burden is on a party meeting a 
verified motion for summary judgment to submit appropriately 
documented facts, not conclusions, if that party is to meet the 
burden of showing the presence of a material issue of fact re-
quiring trial.) Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., (1979) 
596 P2d 1025. 
THIRD, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE FACTS SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
43 AmJr 2d Insurance, §187, p. 270, states the necessary 
elements for a binding insurance contract, with appellants sub-
mitting within parentheses how each element has been met: 
"A contract of insurance must be assented to by both par-
ties either in person or by their agents. There must be a meet-
ing of the minds of the parties on the essential terms and ele-
ments of the contract. These essential terms and elements in-
clude, in general, (1) an insurer (Home); (2) the subject matter 
to be insured or the person insured and his beneficiary (Airport 
_ O A — 
extending its insurance to cover claims against Holiday); (3) 
the risk insured against (fire and liability claims, R392); (4) 
the commencement and period of the risk undertaken by the in-
surer (defined by the terms of the policy between Home and Air-
port) ; (5) the amount of insurance (also defined by the terms 
of the policy between Airport and Home); and (6) the premium, 
being the consideration, and the time in which its to be paid 
(premium provided in declarations of policy between Home and 
Airport, No point ever raised that additional premium, if due, 
was not paid. See Rasmussen v. Western Casualty & Surety Co,, 
15 U2d 333, 393 P2d 376.) 
There is no evidence of a missing element. The contract 
is complete. To do justice to all appellants, this honorable 
court is fully within its prerogatives in declaring the insurance 
covers plaintifffs claim. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IN 
AMOUNT, $246,035,08 AS TO AIRPORT AND HOME 
As stated at the outset of Point I of this Argument, 
plaintiff submitted the issue to Judge Daniels that she sought 
recovery of the full amount of her judgment from Airport and 
Home. Tying in with that, in Point II of that Motion she had 
defined the amount of that judgment by asking: 
"2. Plaintiff moves the judgment in favor of 
plaintiff in the sum of $246,033.08 entered by 
Judge Philip R. Fishier on October 1, 1982, be 
af f i rmed in amount.ff (R440 ) 
In Airport's two memoranda supporting its motion and 
its rejoinder concerning summary judgment (R303-329; 446-460), 
it failed to submit any facts to attack the size of plaintiff's 
judgment. It had taken plaintiff's deposition, and the 
deposition of Dr. Robert Burgone, Head of the L.D.S. Hospital 
Chronic Pain Clinic, which plaintiff had attended, had 
obtained the records from the State Insurance Fund concerning 
the breakdown and total on medical and other benefits plaintiff 
had received, and had had plaintiff independently examined. 
From all of this came nothing admissible in a summary judgment 
hearing to support Airport's contention that plaintiff's 
judgment was collusively high. 
During progress of the second hearing before Judge 
Daniels, Home's attorney submitted his affidavit (R476-481) to 
plaintiff and the ccurt. Plaintiff did not object to that 
affidavit on basis of time limits but in glancing at it stated 
that it appeared to contain no verified material. The affi-
davit for example contained the medical report of the doctor 
who had dene the independent medical examination on plaintiff. 
His report totally missed the diagnosis of fibrocytis. Being 
a letter it was not in affidavit form and so not admissible. 
To verify her motion as to damages plaintiff had 
submitted Dr. Baer's Affidavit (R181-186), plaintiff's Affidavit 
(R187-189) and the Affidavit of her associate counsel, James 
Hawkes, explaining how the dollar and cent amount submitted to 
Judge Fishier had been arrived at (R362-364), and the Affidavit 
of Gerald Nielsen, attorney for the Maws, that the defense had 
first been tendered repeatedly to Airport and Home and was a 
judgment from necessity, not collusion. (R365-368) 
In sum, as in the previous point, we have plaintiffs' 
thoroughly verifying the facts on which Judge Fishier's Summary 
Judgment was based. 
Opposing this, while we had Home's counsel's Affidavit, 
and a plethora of sources available to use for counteraffidavits 
if he chose, he has no facts stated which serve as admissible 
rebuttal. Even when he cites figures, he used no transcript 
or other sources to verify the figures that he uses. 
It must be granted that there was no trial and no cross-
examination concerning plaintiff's damages. This could be a 
ground for Airport to ask an extension of time in which to 
respond to plaintiff's motion. Strand v. Associated Students 
of University of Utah, (1977) 561 P2d 191. Airport didn't do 
so, and the time has now passed. 
Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment, 
the factual context being ripe, if the law supports her on 
damages. 
Airport has contended, as ruled by Judge Daniels, that 
the measure of liability for one who fails to procure insurance 
for another, is indemnity, out-of-pocket expense, rather than 
the actual amount of the judgment confessed. There is some 
support for that position in older law, but the modern trend is 
that when liability insurance is the issue, the amount of the 
policy not what the uninsured defendant can come up with,is the 
measure of damage. 
Typical is Glovinden Co. v. Blomfield, 562 P2d 1372 
(Ariz. 1977). Insured not defended by insurer settled by paying 
$10,000 cash and consenting to a default judgment for $175,000 
and the assignment of his policy rights. Affirmed. 
"The insured was justified in taking steps 
to protect himself...even if it were ruled 
that a convenant not to execute by one party 
releases another party whose liability was 
derivitive, an exception to this rule should 
be recognized where the insured made a covenant 
in order to protect himself after being abandoned 
by the insurer. This is especially true where 
the covenant as here expressly reserves that the 
plaintiff has every right to proceed against the 
insured's insurance carrier...." 
First National Indemnity Company v. Mercado, 511 SW2d 354 (Tex. 
Civ. Ap. 1974). 
"The insured in this case thus had a similar 
need to protect himself since he has every reason 
to expect that the insurer will refuse to pay any 
judgment. The right of the insured to protect 
himself has been approved by a leading 
authority on insurance law, J. Appleman, 
Insurance Law Practice, Section 4514, Page 143. 
Note 54.30 (Supp., 1976) has also accepted the 
principle that the insured is entitled to pro-
tect himself when his insurer refuses to defend... 
We hold for the reasons discussed above, insureds 
are entitled to summary judgment against the 
appellant-insurer. 
Deblon v. Beaton, 247 A2d 174 (NJ 1968). Again involving 
a confession of judgment and assignment of rights by an unde-
fended insured, it affirms that indemnity concepts are not 
applicable, but rather insurance concepts stating: 
MThus Jersey (the insurer) argues that plaintiff 
is precluded because its liability under its 
policy is 'to pay on behalf of the insured all 
sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages,1 and its insured 
cannot become 'legally obligated' to pay anything 
because of the convenant not to execute. Such 
conclusions might be tenable if the policy was 
one of indemnity against loss rather than insurance 
against liability. (Emphasis added) 
...Insurance, of course, is an instrument of 
social policy that victims of negligence be com-
pensated and such compensation is in the public 
interest. The interest of defendant-tort feasors 
is to conclude the case within the limits of their 
insurance coverage...since the carrier has a duty 
to act in good faith where its interests conflict 
with those of the insured in connection with 
settlement negotiations, it certainly cannot com-
plain about the partial settlement, as in the present 
case, after disclaiming and refusing to negotiate at 
all. The law, in addition, favors settlements." 
Metcalf v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 126 
NW2d 471 (Neb. 1964). 
"It was evidenced in the record that the judgment 
was reasonable and within the range of a possible 
jury verdict. The trial court's judgment was 
supported by evidence and, if not being clearly 
wrong, no basis exists for any interference by this 
court with the judgment entered. (Emphasis added) 
Fullerton v. United States Casualty Company, 167 NW 700 (Neb.): 
"It is a well settled principle where a person 
is responsible over to another, either by 
operation of law or express contract, and he is 
duly notified of the pendency of the suit against 
the person to whom he is liable, and full oppor-
tunity is afforded him to defend the action, a 
judgment if obtained without fraud or collusion 
will be conclusive against him, whether he appeared 
or not. 27 Am Jur Indemnity, Section 35, Page 478, 
42 C.J.S. Indemnity, Section 32, Page 613." 
American Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Williams, 34 SW2d 396 
(Texas Civ. App., 1930). 
Jones v. Southern Surety Company, 230 NW 381, (Iowa 1929). 
Mid-America Corp. v. Roach, 412 P2d 188 (0klaa 1966). 
Granite State Ins. Corp. v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 
573 P2d 506 (Ariz. App. 1977). 
Robinson v. Janay, 253 A2d 816 (NJ 1969). 
Mid-America Corp. v. Arochanvay, 412 P2d 188 (Okla. 1966), 
Conestoga Chemical Corp. v. F. H. Simonton Inc., 269 A2d 237 
(Del. 1970). Liability of broker who failed to obtain insurance 
was precisely the same as that of the insurer. 
Johnson v. Smith, 293 SE2d 644 (NC 1982). 
Dixie Fire Insurance Company v. American Bonding Company, 
78 SE 430 (NC 1913). 
Harrell v. Davenport, 299 SE2d 308 (NC 1983), 
Wiles v. Mullinax, 148 SE2d 229 (NC 1966). 
Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 230 Cal Ap 2d 788, 12 ARL 3d 1142. 
"It is true that as a general rule when an 
insurer whose policy requires it to defend its 
insured, receives notice of a suit against him 
and is allowed an opportunity to defend, but 
refuses, it is bound by the findings and judgment 
therein.M McCarty v. Parks, 564 P2d 1122 (Ut. 1977). 
Ammerman v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 22 U2d 187, 450 P2d 460: 
"This agreement is executory in nature and does 
not, as of now, amount to an accord and satisfaction• 
The promise of Ammerman (the insured) has net 
been fully performed. This court has stated... 
the law of accord and satisfaction makes a 
distinction between an agreement accepted as a 
satisfaction and an agreement whose performance is 
to be accepted as satisfaction. 
Farmers contends, however, that even though the 
agreement is not considered an accord and satis-
faction, Ammermanfs claim is nevertheless barred 
because he has suffered no damage. He has not 
paid the excess judgment or any part thereof. 
We are cognizant of the several cases which hold 
there must be payment by the insured before he 
can maintain against his insurer for the excess 
judgment. However, we are of the opinion that the 
cases to the contrary (and perhaps the majority) 
are the better reasoned. 
Three very sound reasons justify the adoption of 
this non-payment view, (1) Such view prevents an 
insurer from benefiting from the impecuniousness of 
an insured who has a meritorious claim but cannot 
first pay the judgment imposed upon him; (2) Such 
view negates the possibility that the insurer would 
be '...less responsive to its trust duties when the 
insured is unable to pay the excess judgment. Were 
payment the rule, an insurer with an insolvent 
insured cculd unreasonably refuse to settle, or, at 
worst, it would only be liable for the amount speci-
fied by the policy. To permit this would be to impa 
the usefulness of insurance for the poor man.' (3) 
Such view recognizes that the fact of entry of the 
judgment against itself against the insured consti-
tutes real damage to him because of potential harm 
to his credit rating." 
In regard to the last point in Ammerman, it should b 
noted that Holiday is in business. It leases the cars that 
then rents to customers. The $246,000.00 judgment standing 
not only impairs its credit, but impairs its ability to do 
business with conservative, business-like entities who will 
check its credit and judgments. 
Rieth-Riley Const, v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins., 4-08 NE2d 640 (Ind. 1980) 
affirmed a ccnsent default by lessor for $100,000 in a case 
where the lessor of the truck was sued when the lessee was 
involved in an accident and the lessee had failed to procure 
insurance he had agreed to obtain. Policy limits on the lessee's 
other vehicles were $1,000,000. The court affirmed that the 
lessee was liable for the whole amount of the judgment even 
though it was uncontested and by default and further awarded 
plaintiff attorney fees and interest from the date of the 
default judgment because these wouldn't have been incurred if 
the lessee had been insured. 
As indicated in Ammerman, a majority of states hold 
such a judgment is valid. Typical of the cases so holding 
indemnitor-insurer distinctions invalid are the following: 
CTWhere either an indemnitor or liability insurer 
has notice of a proceeding against his indemnitee 
or insured, and is afforded an opportunity to 
appear and defend, a judgment rendered against 
the indemnitee or insured, in the absence of fraud 
or collusion, is conclusive against indemnitor or 
insurer as to all material matters determined 
therein." Coblentz v. American Surety Co. of New 
York, 416 F2d 1059, at 1062 (5 Cir. Fla. 1969). 
Possibly the most interesting case, rejecting indemnity 
when opposed to a confessed judgment, because of the illustrious 
bench, Cardozo, Pound and Lehman, that decided it, is Municipal 
Service Real Estate Co. v. D. B. M« Holding Corp, and National 
Sugar Refining Co. of New Jersey, 178 NE 745, 78 ALR 323 (NY 1931). 
There, the buyer of land sued the seller for a defect in title, 
and the seller sued the party who had sold to him because that 
was where the defect in title had originated, and the original 
seller had given the defendant, an indemnity agreementa Defense 
was tendered to the original seller and refused. Defendant 
then confessed judgment. On appeal, t h e trial court's 
approval of that was affirmed, by Judge Lehman, holding that as 
the same facts would win or lose for either defendant or its 
indemnitor and the indemnitor refused the tendered defense, it 
was bound by a judgment against its indemnitee, "Even though 
the defense is feeble or pretended,M 
Municipal Service also pointed out what befell plaintiff 
here, that to delay the plaintiff's right to trial to try a 
controversy between the original and intermediate parties should 
not be allowed because of its delay to plaintiff, with harm 
to plaintiff being inevitable thereby. 
POINT III 
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE AND REALISTIC 
FOR PLAINTIFF TO HAVE NAMED HOME INSURANCE AS 
A DEFENDANT BUT PLAINTIFF COULD NOT DO SO 
UNDER EXISTING UTAH LAWo THAT LAW SHOULD NOW 
BE CHANGED FOR PARTICULAR CASES. 
In Utah, a plaintiff must direct his action against the 
actual tortfeasor, not the insurer. Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P2d 
1037 (1971); Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 483 P2d 4-47 
(1971). Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967) . 
In those cases where the insurer becomes a real party 
in interest through its conduct, it has to be an unnamed real 
party in interest to meet these cases. 
Home's manuevers against Appellants and Airport are laid 
out in the Statement of Facts, pages 15 to 25. 
Accordingly, plaintiff should not be barred from relief 
against Home because of a failure to name Home Insurance, as 
plaintiff cannot do so. 
As the record indicates, all appellants have been 
careful to keep Home Insurance fully advised, so that no situation 
would arise where Home could claim lack of notice prior to acts 
affecting it. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST, ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS FROM THE DATE OF HER JUDGMENT 
AS AGAINST AIRPORT AND HOME. 
The case already has precedent that attorney fees are 
proper, Judge Dee having awarded them in favor of Holiday when 
it prevailed in obtaining a verdict that Airport was obligated 
to insure it (R295, 112). Nc appeal was taken. 
These fees have been paid by Home. 
The rationale of Reith-Riley, supra, fully applies, 
that it is the duty of the insurer to reimburse the insured 
for attorney fees, when those attorneys are hired only because 
the insurer fails to defend, or to compel the insurer to pay. 
As assignee of Holiday, from the date of Judge Fishier's 
judgment, plaintiff has had the same full rights to the policy 
that Holiday had, and these should include the same rights to 
the reimbursement of fees, together of course with interest 
from the date of that judgment and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
There is the probability, in plaintiff's eyes the 
certainty, that Home has toyed with the parties and with the 
As indicated by Dr. Baer in his affidavit, the plaintiff 
is in such pain that the pain itself disables her from being 
able to work . She has had to endure Home's maneuvers since 
1980. Similarly Holiday and Airport and their owners have had 
to put in the time, the expense and worry incident to Home 
refusing to insure them. It is in the interest of justice, 
and plaintiff urges, that this case be determined as rapidly 
as possible and that Judge Daniels' denial of plaintiff's 
Motions for Summary Judgment be set aside, and this ccurt enter 
its Order validating the entire amount of her judgment and 
extending that judgment to be the liability of Airport and Home 
awarding all appellants their costs and fees. 
DATED March 26, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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